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Introduction
In the last few years there has been a sharp growth in the number of regional trade The second objective is to try to attempt to make some sense of all of these developments. Why are there so many, why are they so varied, why are they occurring now? The world of the GATT at its creation in 1947 was effectively free of regional arrangements, while the world of the late 1870's was one (in Europe at least) of extensive regionalism 4 . I suggest that the latest wave in these agreements appears to reflect a range of factors. There is the demonstration effect of the largest trading entity in the world, the US, going regional with its lag at trading partner first in the 1987 Canadian agreement and then more broadly in NAFTA in 1991, and hence being open to regional negotiation.
There is the subsequent dynamic interplay between regional and multilateral negotiation regional negotiation and agreements aiming to influence multilateral outcomes at the end of the Uruguay Round and later. Subsequently, it has been the failure of attempts to broaden multilateral negotiation into non trade areas such as competition policy and investment that have created the opportunity for regional arrangements to evolve through targeted sub group negotiation. And once the wave of regionalism has been initiated, the career opportunities for negotiators completing regional agreements and the uses for politicians of trade treaties which demonstrate action to electorates has further fueled their growth.
The paper concludes by discussing the future for regional arrangements as the Doha Round draws to a seemingly minimalist and inconsequential conclusion. The paradox posed is one of regional (and primarily bilateral) agreements as seemingly left as the area of dynamism for new global integration in terms of number and coverage of agreements, while at the same time being viewed by many researchers as largely diplomatic and of limited substance relative to multilateral disciplines embedded in the WTO. Council, and is now negotiating with India, Singapore, and others 11 . Japan, long with no regional agreements now has a series of concluded agreements with Singapore, ASEAN and others. India is a further country joining this trend with new regional agreements with ASEAN and Singapore.
The Growth of Regional Agreements
As of September 2005, 334 regional trade agreements had been notified to the WTO committee on regional trade agreements, and of those notified 183 were still in force.
Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) One way to approach these agreements is as tariff plus agreements, and recognize that in many cases the plus component dominates the tariff part in length of text and likely in significance given that in many cases the MFN tariff rates are sufficiently low that the margins of preference involved have limited impacts on trade.
But a further element in assessing these agreements is to recognize their significance as process rather than simply instrument based agreements that limit the use of trade based interventions (tariffs). The 1957 Treaty of Rome set out a road map for ever deeper integration in Europe moving initially from joint tariff removed among partners on to a tax union and eventually to economic and monetary union a common currency, a common budgetary and competition policy structure, and beyond. As such it stands in sharp contrast to the 1991 NAFTA which is a one off agreement that does not set out an ongoing process for North American economic integration. Having noted this tendency for regional agreements to evolve as formalized management arrangements for bilateral economic interaction, more so than treaty based agreements to mutually limit the use of border measures, a further striking feature is the diversity among the agreements themselves.
In part this is reflected in the sharply differing focus of agreements across the partners A feature of many of the larger country agreements is the seeming clear tie in both to multilateral negotiating process, and also the use of sequential bilateral or regional negotiation. For instance, the failure of the 1990 ministerial in Brussels meant to conclude the GATT Uruguay Round on schedule was followed within a week by a US declaration to launch regional negotiations in the Western hemisphere as a way of exerting pressure on the EU and others for multilateral conclusion. Also, as a further negotiation. These additional issues added to the trade negotiation differ both between multilateral and regional negotiations, and across individual regional negotiations.
The number and complexity of these agreements makes synthesizing their features a non-trivial task, and so I now discuss only a subset of recent agreements involving both ASEAN as a single entity, and individual ASEAN countries negotiating separately (Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore). ASEAN at this point has concluded three formal framework agreements (with China, Japan, and India) and aims to active more substantive arrangements and has a further 2 (with Korea, and Australia & New Zealand jointly) under negotiation. Singapore has concluded 6 substantive agreements (with the US, EFTA, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Jordan) and is negotiating a further 12.
Thailand has concluded 2 full agreements (with Australia, Bahrain), 2 framework agreements (with the US, India), 1 ancillary agreement to a wider ASEAN agreement only covering vegetable and fruits (with China), and is negotiating a further 5 agreements.
Malaysia has a single bilateral investment treaty with the US, but is negotiating a further 5 agreements. These agreements vary greatly in length, specificity and coverage; some are detailed with substantial specificity (especially the Singapore-US agreement).
What is striking about them as a set is their breadth of coverage. Several areas beyond current WTO disciplines are dealt with including competition policy, mutual recognition (both of professional qualifications and product standards and testing), movement of persons and visa/work permit arrangements, investment, and cooperation in specific areas.
Of the ASEAN blocwide and regional agreements, six contain provisions relating to competition policy; Singapore-US, Singapore-EFTA, Singapore-New Zealand, Singapore -Australia, Singapore-Japan, and Thailand-Australia. The two ASEAN agreements (with China and India) have no coverage of competition policy. Singapore at the time of negotiation with the US had no formal competition law, but is now in the process of enacting such laws.
The ways in which competition policy is dealt with in these agreements varies from case to case. The most detailed treatment occurs in the Singapore-US agreement, and is set out in a 8 page chapter (12) not titled competition policy but instead "Anti
Competitive Business Conduct, Designated Monopolies and Government Enterprises".
This chapter commingles broad statements of principles on matters related to competition policy and detailed and specific commitments by the two parties on a range of competition related matters.
Other agreements cover competition in less detail, and with some variation. The
Thai-Australia agreement commits both governments to actually apply their competition laws, but allows measures or sectors to be exempt from commitments on public interest grounds if done in a transparent way. The Singapore-Australia agreement is similar but goes a little further. The Singapore-EFTA agreement is even shorter, comprising 11 lines of text (in chapter 10).
The competition policy component of these agreements can be seen as a partial bilateral response to the failure in the WTO to negotiate on competition policy. In the WTO these was considerable discussion of competition related issues following the 1996
Singapore ministerial and prior to the launch of the Doha Round. As Bhattacharjea (2004) identifies, the directions proposed for a multilateral agreement in competition policies in these discussions included achieving investment promoting benefits of harmonized Investment is dealt with in more of the country agreements than is competition policy and is also covered in the ASEAN agreements. There is also more commonality in approach, with central commitments being (either or both) National Treatment and MFN treatment for foreign investors (typically) alongside provisions relating to expropriation, compensation, and (in some cases) repatriation of earnings.
The ASEAN -Japan and ASEAN -India agreements are virtually the same and contain general commitments to create a liberal and competitive environment for investment, to strengthen cooperation in investment, improve transparency of laws and regulations, and to protect investors. The ASEAN-China agreement has similar general provisions, but the language differs.
The Thai-Australia agreement begins with definitions but then centers its liberalization commitments on most favoured nation treatment for investors, with separate "pre-establishment" and "post-establishment" national treatment provisions.
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There is then language relating to the promotion and protection of investments, and provisions relating to expropriation and compensation for losses as well as access to dispute settlement.
These agreements show much more commonality of approach for investment than is the case of competition policy. There are substantive commitments, and interestingly of relatively similar form to those proposed for the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment. In this area, regional negotiations clearly seem to be fulfilling the role of a partial substitute for a wider multilateral agreement between countries who were not (in the main) forces of resistance to a possible agreement on multilateral disciplines in the WTO.
Issues related to mutual recognition in these agreements arise under a number of chapter headings in the various texts. Issues of product testing and standards are in chapters on technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions, and particular sectoral chapters, such as telecommunications, touch on product standards while chapters on services deal with recognition of professional certification. This treatment of mutual recognition differs substantially from the explicit pairwise country treaties on mutual recognition that have been negotiated in recent years. These typically involve both mutual agreement to accept agreed competent authorities for the mutual determination of standards, and agreements on the mutual recognition of more narrowly specified items (such as notorial attestations, or certificates).
The ASEAN blocwide and country agreements also deal with issues related to movement of persons and usually in separate chapters. This is reflective both of the growing significance of visa and work permit issues in the global economy and the absence of multilateral venues for dealing with them (see Ng and Whalley 2004) . 25 In this case, country or regional agreements provide the platform for adding an issue under current discussion, but with no clear multilateral forum for discussion. Bargaining across issues and with it, the greater probability of achieving results presumably provides the rationale for this. First, their complexity seems to reflect the relative ease of customizing agreements to cover non trade barrier issues in ways acceptable to the two parties so as to avoid a lowest common denominator outcome from common multilateral agreements. Thus, two countries may choose to cover, say, competition policy or investment in their pairwise agreement even if other countries are unwilling to negotiate in the area and bilaterally they can cover such an issue in a way which differs from that of any other bilateral pair.
As such, one can argue that the attempt multilaterally in the WTO to first deal with an expanded agenda beyond conventional trade issues such areas as environment, competition policy, labor standards, and investment (the so called Singapore issues, after Singapore 1996), and its subsequent failure as these issues first fell in profile and then were withdrawn from the Doha Round agenda has resulted in renewed efforts bilaterally.
Conventional tariff based RTA's thus provide a convenient platform to which there non trade issues can also be appended bilaterally and these issues can vary from case to case.
Second is the linkage to multilateral process. If multilateral process seems slowed or The pursuit since the early 1990's of regional agreements by smaller powers with larger powers has been accelerated by demonstration that the larger powers were now willing to proceed regionally. The GATT as it grew after 1957 with the formation of the EU through the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds can be seen, in effect, as a form of bilateral accommodation between the two largest entities in the trading system which through MFN also applied to third entities most of whom had their dominant trade with either the US or the EU. Multilateralism in the GATT can be viewed as a peace treaty between the US and the EU that they would mutually extend whatever they negotiated with third parties to each other. The later rise of Japan and its accommodation within this system as a multilateral non regional entity preserved its structure until the late 1980s.
In the late 1980's, things begin to change. The US first regional went with Canada, and then with NAFTA. The Uruguay Round proved hard to conclude and regional negotiation was in part used as a mechanism to try to achieve multilateral closure. The Doha Round then became hard to launch, and harden to conclude. The subsequent attempt to the broaden the bargaining in the WTO to non trade areas failed, but the demand for such The net result has been sharp growth and acceleration in RTA's of the form and extent set out earlier.
Where is the process headed? To some degree the jury is still out. If the content of these RTAs remains vague, the agreements primarily are diplomatic arrangements negotiated for geopolitical linkage rather than significant economic impact.
But agreements do invoke substantive economic relationships and their coverage is broad.
Where they head may as much as anything be determined by what happens multilaterally. If, as most expect, the Doha Round concludes with a minimal outcome, dispute settlement in the WTO weakens, and multilateral disciplines are perceived to weaken, then regionalism as the central form of policy coordination in the system will grow. And if into non OECD trade continues grow at its current high rates (China is now India's 2 nd largest export market), the desire for trade management of these relationships will grow. Weakening multilateralism seemingly inevitably leaves a growing patchwork quilt of regional policy cooperation as the ever more prominent component of the system.
. Conclusions
In this paper I seek to both characterize and assess the recent wave of regional agreements in the trading system which has accelerated since 2000. Nearly 400
agreements now exist, and by 2008 according to WTO analyze a significant number of countries will be party to more than 30 agreements. I suggest these agreements are characterized by several central features; substantial diversity in form, broadened coverage of issues to the degree that RTAs seemingly now provide a platform to which a range of issues are appended; vagueness in language and commitment so that they should be understood as much as process agreements as mutual limitations on trade restrictions measures; and in may cases sharp asymmetries of partner size.
I suggest that a number of factors account for growth in these agreements. These include the use of RTAs as a platform to append a range of issues for targeted bilateral negotiation; the failure of multilateral negotiation to extend bargaining to non trade issues point Uruguay Round; the prospect of limited failure multilateral process; the demonstration effect of large entities going regional and smaller entities seeking safe haven agreements with their most important large partners; and the uses of agreements by
politicians and negotiators to demonstrate action and negotiation seeking advancement.
I conclude by suggesting that weakened multilateralism after a minimalist conclusion to the Doha Round may well only accelerate this process.
